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ABSTRACT. This paper develops a heuristic of different modes of philosophical engagement 
with Michel Foucault’s work with the aim to aid self-reflection about contemporary uses of Fou-
cault. Drawing on debates in the history of philosophy, I describe contextualism, appropriation-
ism, and methodologism as three strands of Foucault scholarship. I then examine queer and fem-
inist philosophical engagements with Foucault to explicate and illustrate the aims and strengths 
of each strand. I conclude by spelling out the larger implications for different uses of Foucault for 
philosophical practice and make the case for a methodological pluralism that draws on all avail-
able modes of inquiry. 
Keywords: Contextualism; Appropriationism; Methodologism; queer theory; feminist philoso-
phy. 
INTRODUCTION 
In a 1974 interview, asked about the audience for whom he wrote, Foucault famously 
answered that he intended for his books to be “machines … instruments, utensils, 
weapons” that would be used as “a sort of tool-box through which others can rummage 
to find a tool with which they can do what seems good to them, in their domain.”1 A lot 
of rummaging has been done since. A 2007 study lists Foucault as the most cited author 
in the humanities,2 and in 2016 Discipline and Punish ranked seventh among the 25 most 
cited books in the social sciences.3 A steady stream of posthumous publications, includ-
ing Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France and the long-awaited and much-
anticipated fourth volume of the History of Sexuality, Les aveux de la chair (Confessions of 
                                                        
1 Michel Foucault, “Prisons et asiles dans le mécanisme du pouvoir” [1974], in Dits et écrits II: 1970–
1975, ed. Daniel Defert and François Ewald (1994), 523; my translation. 
2 “Most Cited Authors of Books in the Humanities, 2007,” Times Higher Education (2007). 
3 Elliott Green, “What Are the Most-Cited Publications in the Social Sciences (According to Google 
Scholar)?” Impact of Social Sciences (2016). 
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the Flesh), have added new tools to the tool-box and ensure a continuously growing 
body of Foucault scholarship. 
In light of the unabated excitement about Foucault’s work, some scholars have begun 
to reflect on how his work and thought are taken up today. In his 2015 paper “Two Uses 
of Michel Foucault in Political Theory,” for instance, Colin Koopman distinguishes be-
tween concept and method as two distinct ways of using Foucault’s work in political 
theory.4 And in the recent volume Foucault(s), a group of experts reflect on various uses 
of Foucault’s work in disciplines like philosophy, history, sociology, law, and econom-
ics.5 
This paper seeks to contribute to this emerging interest in systematic reflection on 
contemporary Foucault scholarship by examining different modes in which Foucault’s 
work is engaged philosophically. In section 2, I draw on debates in the history of philos-
ophy to distinguish three strands of Foucault scholarship: contextualism; appropriation-
ism; and methodologism. These strands can be differentiated by their aims and methods 
and constitute distinct ways of doing philosophy following – that is, after, about, with, 
and according to – Foucault. Sections 3 to 5 examine queer and feminist philosophical 
engagements with Foucault to explicate and illustrate the aims and strengths of each 
strand. This thematic focus allows for a clearer comparison of contextualist, appropria-
tionist, and methodologist uses of Foucault as well as the relationship between them. It 
also brings into view the different ways in which Foucault’s work may contribute to ad-
dressing some tensions between (1) Foucault and feminist philosophy; (2) queer theory 
and feminist philosophy; and (3) Foucauldian analyses of sex and post-Foucauldian bio-
political theory. In section 6, I conclude by clarifying these contributions and spelling 
out the larger implications for different uses of Foucault for philosophical practice. 
PHILOSOPHICAL USES OF FOUCAULT 
Contextualism and Appropriationism 
Insofar as the question of how to do philosophy following Foucault is a question about 
how to engage with a past philosopher, it is helpful to begin by situating different ways 
of taking up Foucault within larger debates about the relationship between philosophy 
and its history. According to Lærke, Smith, and Schliesser, this relationship is commonly 
understood in one of two ways, which differ in the perceived purpose of studying his-
torical texts and figures and the appropriate methods for accomplishing their respective 
purpose. On the one hand, contextualists hold that “the history of philosophy is to be 
                                                        
4 Colin Koopman, “Two Uses of Michel Foucault in Political Theory: Concepts and Methods in Gior-
gio Agamben and Ian Hacking,” Constellations 22:4 (2005), 671–685. 
5 Jean-François Braunstein, Daniele Lorenzini, Ariane Revel, Judith Revel and Arianna Sforzini, eds., 
Foucault(s) (2017).  
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studied and understood for its own sake and on its own terms.”6 The aim is to provide 
“the correct historical account” of the meaning of a text or the intentions of a past phi-
losopher.7 On the other hand, appropriationists regard the history of philosophy as “a 
source of ideas and arguments that may be of use in current philosophy.”8 Appropria-
tionists are not interested in historical texts and figures for their own sake, but seek to 
reconstruct a past philosopher’s position in hopes that “these reconstructions yield con-
ceptual results and address contemporary concerns in an interesting way.”9 
The contrasting aims of contextualists and appropriationists correspond to different 
methodological orientations, which we might characterize in terms of empirical and 
speculative analysis.10 In their quest for achieving correct interpretations of a historical 
text of figure, contextualists tend to use empirical methods that are commonly likened to 
cultural anthropology,11 archaeology,12 or detective work.13 These methods involve 
“fieldwork”14 in the archive, immersion in the cultural context and controversies of the 
time, attention to inconsistencies between claims made in public and private, and con-
sideration of the intellectual, political, cultural, religious, etc. milieu of the author under 
examination. Representatives of the appropriationist camp, by contrast, rely on forms of 
conceptual analysis that “transcend the empirical”15 and are aimed at facilitating philos-
ophy’s task of “introducing, clarifying, articulating, or simply redirecting concepts.”16 
The distinct aims and methods of contextualist and appropriationist scholarship map 
on to two strands of philosophical engagement with Foucault. Using the methods of 
contextualism, the first strand examines Foucault’s texts as well as his political and intel-
lectual milieu to offer interpretations that are supported by textual evidence as well as 
by what Ursula Goldenbaum calls “the facts,” that is, “the surrounding reality of … au-
                                                        
6 Mogens Lærke, Justin E. H. Smith, and Eric Schliesser, “Introduction,” in Philosophy and Its History: 
Aims and Methods in the Study of Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Mogens Lærke, Justin E. H. Smith, and 
Eric Schliesser (2013), 1. 
7 Ibid., 2. 
8 Ibid., 1. 
9 Ibid., 2. 
10 Readers interested in a more refined treatment of these questions may wish to consult Richard Ror-
ty, Jerome B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner, Philosophy in History: Essays in the Historiography of 
Philosophy (1984); Mogens Lærke, Justin E. H. Smith, and Eric Schliesser, eds., Philosophy and Its Histo-
ry (2013). 
11 See Mogens Lærke, “The Anthropological Analogy and the Constitution of Historical Perspectiv-
ism,” in Philosophy and Its History, 27–29. 
12 Justin E. H. Smith, “The History of Philosophy as Past and as Process,” in Philosophy and Its History, 
30–49. 
13 Ursula Goldenbaum, “Understanding the Argument through Then-Current Public Debates or My 
Detective Method of History of Philosophy,” in Philosophy and Its History, 71–90. 
14 Lærke, “The Anthropological Analogy,” 37. 
15 José Amado Benardete, Infinity: An Essay in Metaphysics (1964), 285. 
16 Eric Schliesser, “Philosophic Prophesy,” in Philosophy and Its History, 209. 
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thors, the rules of discourse at the time, opportunities for publication, censorship, pre-
vailing theological demands, political conditions, etc.”17 
An example of this first contextualist strand of Foucault scholarship is the long-
standing debate over whether Foucault is a philosopher or historian.18 While some 
commentators defend the philosophical nature of Foucault’s project, for instance as an 
attempt to reinvigorate transcendental philosophy,19 others read (at least some of) Fou-
cault’s inquiries as “primarily works of history, not philosophy in the traditional 
sense.”20 For yet others, this debate fails to recognize Foucault’s crucial insight about the 
historicity of both philosophy and history – or, to be more precise, the modern concept 
of history as “continuous, dialectical, and, above all, progressive.”21 Despite differences 
in interpretation, these scholars have shared aims and methods: they seek to offer, if not 
the correct, at least the most plausible interpretation of Foucault’s work on the basis of 
his writings, which they situate in relation to the intellectual and political context of his 
time. 
In contrast to contextualist efforts to understand Foucault’s project on its own terms, 
Foucault scholarship also features a plethora of appropriationist work that draws on his 
studies as a conceptual resource for contemporary analysis. Consider as an example a 
slew of publications that frame analyses of phenomena like security, development, disa-
bility, dignity, breast cancer, or feeling through Foucault’s concept of biopolitics.22 Here 
                                                        
17 Goldenbaum, “Understanding the Argument,” 75. 
18 See Amy Allen, “‘Psychoanalysis and Ethnology’ Revisited: Foucault’s Historicization of History,” 
The Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (2017), 31–46; Thomas R. Flynn, “The Philosopher-Historian as 
Cartographer: Mapping History with Michel Foucault,” Research in Phenomenology 29:1 (1999), 31–50; 
Gary Gutting, “Foucault, Hegel, and Philosophy,” in Foucault and Philosophy, ed. Timothy O’Leary 
and Christopher Falzon (2010), 17–35; Béatrice Han, Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcenden-
tal and the Historical [1998] (2002); Béatrice Han-Pile, “Is Early Foucault a Historian? History, History 
and the Analytic of Finitude,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 31:5–6 (2005), 585–608; Clare O’Farrell, 
Foucault – Historian or Philosopher? (1989); Timothy O’Leary and Christopher Falzon, eds., Foucault and 
Philosophy (2010); Paul Veyne, “Foucault Revolutionizes History,” in Foucault and His Interlocutors, ed. 
Arnold I. Davidson (1997), 146–82. 
19 Han, Foucault’s Critical Project. 
20 Gary Gutting, review of Foucault’s Critical Project (2003). This is not to suggest that Gutting does not 
regard Foucault as a philosopher. He clearly does, as is evident in Gary Gutting, French Philosophy in 
the Twentieth Century (2001); Gary Gutting, Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy Since 1960 (2011); 
Gary Gutting, “Michel Foucault,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014). 
21 Allen, “‘Psychoanalysis and Ethnology’ Revisited,” 33. 
22 See Michael Dillon, Biopolitics of Security: A Political Analytic of Finitude (2015); Susan Greenhalgh, 
“Weighty Subjects: The Biopolitics of the U.S. War on Fat,” American Ethnologist 39:3 (2012), 471–87; 
Maren Klawiter, The Biopolitics of Breast Cancer (2008); Sandro Mezzadra, Julian Reid, and Ranabir 
Samaddar, eds., The Biopolitics of Development: Reading Michel Foucault in the Postcolonial Present (2013); 
David T. Mitchell, The Biopolitics of Disability: Neoliberalism, Ablenationalism, and Peripheral Embodiment 
(2015); Stephen Morton and Stephen Bygrave, Foucault in an Age of Terror: Essays on Biopolitics and the 
Defence of Society (2008); Julian Reid, The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal Modernity 
and the Defence of Logistical Societies (2009); Camille Robcis, “The Biopolitics of Dignity,” South Atlantic 
Quarterly 115:2 (2016), 313–30; Kyla Schuller, The Biopolitics of Feeling: Race, Sex, and Science in the Nine-
teenth Century (2017). 
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Foucault’s conceptual innovations are applied to problems and sites not studied by Fou-
cault himself. 
As Koopman notes, however, Foucault’s concepts are the result of detailed empirical 
inquiry into particular problems in specific historical and geographic sites. Thus, their 
extension to other problems and sites risks jettisoning their explanatory force. As an ex-
ample, Koopman discusses Agamben’s appropriation of the notion of biopower,23 which 
Foucault elaborates to capture a particular constellation of technologies of power and 
political rationalities that emerged in Western Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. 
Agamben, by contrast, treats the concept biopower not as the product of empirical analy-
sis, but as “categorial,” that is, “as an ideational category that structures the very possi-
bility of inquiry itself.”24 For Koopman, this mode of philosophical engagement with 
Foucault goes against the latter’s characteristic commitments insofar as it results in a 
transcendentalization of what are, for Foucault, deeply historical concepts. Consequent-
ly, where Foucault uses the term biopower to refer to a historically specific constellation 
of power relations, Agamben uses it to describe an ontological condition of “the politi-
cal” writ large. It appears, then, that whereas Agamben and Foucault use the same 
word, i.e., biopower, they do not refer to the same concept. They are, therefore, talking 
about different things.25 
Fidelity or Relevance: A Dilemma? 
This discussion draws our attention to a more general dilemma that emerges from a con-
textualist commitment to correct understanding and fidelity to the intentions and con-
cerns of a philosopher, on the one hand, and an appropriationist effort to use historical 
sources as inspiration for contemporary philosophical work, on the other. This dilemma 
can be described as follows: from the perspective of a contextualist commitment to fidel-
ity, appropriationists commit misunderstanding, false attribution, and revisionism. 
From the point of view of appropriationist efforts to make historical sources relevant for 
current work, contextualists are engaged in historicism; they are intellectual historians 
rather than philosophers, who seek to advance the state of the discipline.26 
Lærke, Smith, and Schliesser suggest that a possible way out of this dilemma is of-
fered by a tradition of philosophy that understands philosophy itself as a historical prac-
tice, the concepts generated by which practice are, accordingly, also historically specific. 
                                                        
23 See in particular Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life [1995], trans. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen (1998); State of Exception [2003] (2005). For methodological reflections on Foucault see 
Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method [2008], trans. Luca D’Isanto and Kevin Attell (2009); 
What Is an Apparatus?: And Other Essays [2006], trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (2009). 
24 Koopman, “Two Uses of Foucault,” 576. 
25 It might be argued that such equivocation not only violates principles of parsimony, clarity, and 
conceptual coherence commonly accepted by philosophers but also obscures and even erases im-
portant differences between heterogeneous techniques of power and political rationalities. For discus-
sion of equivocation and conceptual sleights see Mary Beth Mader, Sleights of Reason: Norm, Bisexuali-
ty, Development (2011). 
26 For a more detailed discussion of these charges see Lærke, Smith, and Schliesser, “Introduction.” 
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Taking seriously the historicity of concepts, they argue, historians can “build on the past 
in a way that is both attentive to it and, at the same time, seeking to overcome its histori-
cally conditioned limitations.”27 On this view, it is possible to “inherit” a philosopher’s 
concepts, to use Amy Allen’s term, without overextending them to the point where they 
lose explanatory power.28 Accordingly, we might suggest that even though some users 
of Foucault’s concepts might compromise their analytic grip by categorizing and tran-
scendentalizing these concepts, this is not a necessary feature of appropriationist Fou-
cault scholarship. Instead, it is a bug of some varieties of appropriationism whose insuf-
ficiently historicized use of Foucault’s work results in a kind of transcendental philoso-
phy Foucault himself rejected.29 Attention to the historical and contextual specificity of 
Foucauldian concepts, by contrast, allows for their strategic, rather than categorical, de-
ployment as analytic tools “through which it is possible to interrogate the historically 
specific force relationships underpinning our political present.”30 
Nevertheless, contextualists might insist that insofar as all appropriation entails some 
degree of resignification of what is appropriated, any appropriationist use of concepts 
for anything other than their original purpose betrays, to some extent, the “actual con-
cerns of the historical figure whose work has selectively been called into service.”31 On 
this account, any application of Foucault’s concepts to a question or problem about 
which he had nothing to say necessarily entails speculative (i.e., conceptual, not empiri-
cal) work that compromises the original and, thus, presumably true meaning and use of 
his words. 
One way to respond to this charge is to deny that the dilemma between “getting it 
right” and “making it relevant” is a dilemma at all. In fact, it might be argued, contextu-
alism and appropriationism are two distinct and incommensurable modes of engaging 
with historical material whose value or success depends on how well they achieve their 
respective aims. That is, the standard of evaluation is immanent to the particular mode 
of inquiry that is pursued. Thus, one might suggest that judging contextualists by ap-
propriationist standards, and vice versa, is a category mistake: contextualists and ap-
                                                        
27 Ibid., 3. 
28 Amy Allen, The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory (2016), xiii. 
By inheritance, Allen means the process of taking up a philosopher’s work while “simultaneously 
radically transforming it” (ibid.). 
29 There is, of course, some debate about whether or not Foucault rejected transcendental philosophy. 
For representative publications on both sides of the debate see Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, 
eds., Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (1983); Bernard Charles Flynn, “Michel 
Foucault and the Husserlian Problematic of a Transcendental Philosophy of History,” Philosophy To-
day 22:3 (1978), 224–38; Han, Foucault’s Critical Project; Colin Koopman, “Historical Critique or Tran-
scendental Critique in Foucault: Two Kantian Lineages,” Foucault Studies 8 (2010): 100–121; Colin 
McQuillan, “Transcendental Philosophy and Critical Philosophy in Kant and Foucault: Response to 
Colin Koopman,” Foucault Studies 9 (2010), 145–155; Kevin Thompson, “Historicity and Transcenden-
tality: Foucault, Cavaillès, and the Phenomenology of the Concept,” History and Theory 47:1 (2008), 1–
18. 
30 Jemima Repo, The Biopolitics of Gender (2015), 7. 
31 Lærke, Smith, and Schliesser, “Introduction,” 3. 
ERLENBUSCH-ANDERSON 
Foucault Studies, No. 25, 55-83.    61 
propriationists ought to be judged neither by contextualist nor by appropriationist 
standards but by objective meta-philosophical criteria regarding the purpose of philo-
sophical practice as such. In absence of consensus on what this purpose is, however, the 
only standards of evaluation available are immanent ones. Philosophical practice effec-
tively serves many purposes and must, accordingly, be judged by how well it achieves 
its respective goals. 
Still, it seems fairly obvious that even if there is no agreement on the one true aim of 
philosophy, some standards of evaluation apply to any form of philosophical engage-
ment with an author’s work. Most importantly, perhaps, it matters whether a claim 
made about a particular figure is true or false, that is, whether they actually said or 
wrote what is attributed to them. To use the example of Agamben’s appropriation of 
Foucault mentioned above, what is important is not whether Agamben’s concept of bi-
opower is the same as Foucault’s concept of biopower. Instead, what counts is (1) 
whether Agamben makes false attributions (i.e., if what he says about Foucault is true or 
false); (2) if so, whether these false attributions are accidental or intentional (i.e., if what 
he says is a mistake or a willful misrepresentation); and (3) if they are intentional, 
whether they serve as cover for claims that would otherwise not gain traction (i.e., if 
why he says what he says is intellectually virtuous).32 This, however, strikes me not as a 
dilemma between contextualism and appropriationism but as a question of good or bad 
scholarship.33 
To be sure, denying the dilemma between contextualists and appropriationists does 
not settle their disagreement about the proper relationship between the contextualist 
value of fidelity and the appropriationist value of contemporary relevance. Rather, a 
deflationary approach appears to leave us with a choice between either faithful recon-
struction of meaning and intention or subordination of contextualist accuracy to the ad-
vancement of philosophical inquiry. As Deleuze succinctly put it, “there’s only one 
choice: doing the history of philosophy, or transplanting bits of Plato into problems that 
are no longer Platonic ones.”34 
                                                        
32 I take no position, here, on the veracity and virtuousness of Agamben’s claims. For assessments of 
Agamben’s reading of Foucault see Claire Blencowe, “Foucault’s and Arendt’s ‘Insider View’ of Bio-
politics: A Critique of Agamben,” History of the Human Sciences 23:5 (2010), 113–130; Jeffrey Bussolini, 
“Critical Encounter Between Giorgio Agamben and Michel Foucault: Review of Recent Works of 
Agamben,” Foucault Studies 10 (2010), 108–143; Tom Frost, “Agamben’s Sovereign Legalization of 
Foucault,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30:3 (2010), 545–77; Katia Genel, “The Question of Biopower: 
Foucault and Agamben,” trans. Craig Carson, Rethinking Marxism 18:1 (2006): 43–62; Peter Gratton, “A 
‘Retro-version’ of Power: Agamben via Foucault on Sovereignty,” Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy 9:3 (2006): 445–459; Thomas Lemke, “‘A Zone of Indistinction’ – A Critique of 
Giorgio Agamben’s Concept of Biopolitics,” Outlines. Critical Practice Studies 7:1 (2005), 3–13; Mika 
Ojakangas, “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-Power: Agamben and Foucault,” Foucault Studies 2 (2007), 5–
28; Paul Patton, “Agamben and Foucault on Biopower and Biopolitics,” in Giorgio Agamben: Sovereign-
ty and Life, ed. Matthew Calarco and Steven DeCaroli (2007), 203–218; Anke Snoek, “Agamben’s Fou-
cault: An Overview,” Foucault Studies 10 (2010), 44–67. 
33 Taking up this question is a task for another occasion. 
34 Gilles Deleuze, “On Philosophy” [1988], in Negotiations, 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin (1997), 148. 
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Methodologism 
The ostensible impasse between fidelity and relevance obscures a third approach that 
offers a strategy for overcoming this apparent dilemma. As Koopman points out, it is 
possible to satisfy both the contextualist demand for accuracy and the appropriationist 
demand for currency by using a philosopher’s methods, rather than appropriating their 
concepts.35 For the sake of simplicity and distinction, I shall call this approach methodolo-
gism.36 I will explicate this approach more fully in section 5, but for a first pass, we can 
identify its main features in distinction from contextualism and appropriationism. Ian 
Hacking, for instance, clearly distinguishes his work, which he describes as historical 
ontology, from contextualist Foucault scholarship when he notes, “I do not want to ex-
amine his [Foucault’s] work, but to use it to combine history and philosophy in a way 
that may or may not owe a good deal to him.”37 Notice that even though Hacking explic-
itly borrows the label “historical ontology” from Foucault, he neither aims at “explicat-
ing Foucault” nor at using his concepts in an appropriationist fashion.38 Rather, Hacking 
takes inspiration from Foucault’s historico-empirical philosophical practice as a model 
for his own inquiries into how a diverse set of beings – ideas, institutions, people, things, 
classifications, etc. – were constituted. Hacking thus applies Foucauldian methodology 
to issues that, with the exception of madness, were not of interest to Foucault himself. 
Consequently, as Koopman points out, Hacking’s mode of inquiry “requires substantial 
variation of his concepts, or perhaps even detachment from his concepts” despite its 
Foucauldian inheritance.39 Methodologists, in other words, apply a philosopher’s dis-
tinctive methods to problems and contexts that might not have been of concern to that 
philosopher and use, modify, or generate new concepts on the basis of this inquiry.  
To summarize, I have distinguished three principal ways of doing philosophy follow-
ing Foucault: (1) contextualism, which aims to understand Foucault’s project on its own 
terms by way of textual exegesis, hermeneutic interpretation, and contextualization of 
his work; (2) appropriationism, which applies Foucault’s concepts, with more or less 
attentiveness to their historical specificity, to a range of phenomena that may or may not 
have been of concern to Foucault himself; and (3) methodologism, which uses Foucault’s 
methods to conduct archaeologies and genealogies of present issues and takes up, trans-
forms, or abandons his concepts as necessary. 
                                                        
35 See Colin Koopman, Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity (2013); “Two Uses 
of Foucault.” 
36 For a different use of this term see Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflex-
ive Sociology (1992). 
37 Ian Hacking, Historical Ontology (2004), 5. 
38 Ibid., 2. 
39 “Two Uses of Foucault,” 578. 
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Incommensurability, Interdependence, Non-Co-Determinacy 
Before I offer a fuller elaboration of each approach in subsequent sections, a brief clarifi-
cation is in order. My point is not to suggest that methodologism is the best or most le-
gitimate way of taking up Foucault’s work because it avoids or overcomes the dilemma 
of either getting lost in exegesis or overextending concepts beyond their intended pur-
pose. Indeed, it is a mistake to frame the relationship between contextualism and appro-
priationism as a dilemma in the first place. This is not because they are distinct and in-
commensurable kinds of inquiry but because construing their relationship in this way 
assumes that contextualism and appropriationism are discrete and separate projects. But 
as Foucault points out, there is no strict dichotomy between creative discourse, on the 
one hand, and pure commentary or “simple recitation,” on the other.40 According to 
Foucault, 
in what is generally called a commentary, the gap between primary and secondary text 
plays two roles that are interdependent. On the one hand, it allows to construct (and 
indefinitely) new discourses: the surplus of the primary text, its permanence, its status 
as a discourse that can always be re-actualized, the multiple or hidden meaning it is 
thought to hold, the essential reticence and richness attributed to it, all of that is the 
basis for an open possibility to speak. But, on the other hand, whatever techniques are 
put to work, the commentary’s only role is to say finally what was articulated silently 
underneath. According to a paradox that it always displaces but never escapes, it must 
say for the first time that which nevertheless had already been said and repeat tireless-
ly that which, at the same time, had never been said.41 
Foucault here draws our attention to the impossibility of a pure contextualism whose 
achievement “can only ever be play, utopia, or anguish.”42 There is, in other words, an 
element of displacement, modification, and drift in any contextualist project. But this 
does not amount to a cancellation of contextualism or its dissolution into appropriation-
ism. Rather, contextualism and appropriationism are in what Foucault describes as a 
complex relationship which “does not stop to transform itself over time; a relationship 
that takes multiple and divergent forms in a given epoch.”43 
This complex relationship is also evident in the fact that even the most permissive 
appropriationist needs at least some contextualist understanding, however impure, of 
what they appropriate. In the same vein, methodologists not only need to know what 
the method is in order to design their inquiries, but also require knowledge of concepts 
to determine when a concept can usefully be deployed and when it should be revised or 
abandoned. Thus, contextualism is a condition of possibility of both appropriationism 
and methodologism, by which I do not mean more than that one needs to read an au-
thor’s work to use their concepts or methods. Without some contextualist work, it does 
                                                        
40 Michel Foucault, L’ordre du discourse: leçon inaugurale au Collège de France prononcée le 2 décembre 1970 
(1971), 27; my translation. 
41 Ibid., 26–27. 
42 Ibid., 25. 
43 Ibid., 26. 
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not make sense to speak of using their concepts or their methods; rather, one would seem 
to be inventing new concepts and methods. 
Notice, however, that the relationship between appropriationism and methodologism 
cannot be rendered in the same terms. Rather, as Koopman observes, they stand in a 
relationship of non-co-determinacy: 
By this, I mean that one can, for example, employ a given set of methodological con-
straints (e.g., Foucault’s genealogy) without thereby producing any particular set of 
concepts (e.g., discipline). And, to state again what should be obvious, but what is 
overlooked with surprising frequency in the literature, to make use of a given set of 
concepts (e.g., Foucault’s discipline or biopower) is not by itself the use of those con-
cepts according to any particular methodological procedure (e.g., genealogy).44 
That is to say, even though methodologists must have some contextualist understanding 
of a thinker’s concepts, it is not necessary that they also appropriate and extend those 
concepts in order to use a philosopher’s methods. And even though appropriationists 
must engage in some contextualist scholarship to know what the concept is they seek to 
appropriate, they need not apply the same methodology out of which the concept was 
initially developed. 
This brief discussion suggests that while it is possible to analytically distinguish be-
tween contextualist, appropriationist, and methodologist uses of Foucault, there are sig-
nificant overlaps and synergies in philosophical practice. The delineation of three 
strands of Foucault scholarship presented here is, thus, not intended as a technique of 
purification but as a heuristic that allows us to distinguish various aims for which schol-
ars may take up Foucault’s work. While these aims work doubly or triply in philosophi-
cal practice, there is value in separating them out analytically to confer intelligibility on 
Foucault scholarship. 
To illustrate these claims and elucidate contextualist, appropriationist, and method-
ologist uses of Foucault, the following sections examine three particularly illuminating 
representatives of each strand. My intention is not to present them as pure exemplars or 
ideal types but as philosophical works that each have a strong center of gravity that 
helps clarify the analytic distinctions drawn above. The works under discussion are 
Lynne Huffer’s reconstruction of Foucault’s account of sexuality in his early work on 
madness; Penelope Deutscher’s analysis of reproduction through a biopolitical concep-
tual frame; and Jemima Repo’s genealogy of gender as a biopolitical apparatus that 
emerged in 1950s sexological research on intersex children. These are certainly not the 
only possible examples, but they lend themselves to the kind of survey I seek to offer 
here because their shared thematic interest in bringing to bear Foucault’s work on ques-
tions surrounding gender and sexuality allows for a clearer explication of the different 
philosophical accounts to which contextualism, appropriationism, and methodologism 
give rise. Moreover, whereas each strand develops a distinct response to the widespread 
failure to read together Foucault’s work on sex and his analysis of biopower, it is their 
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joint mobilization that promises the most fruitful strategy for advancing philosophical 
scholarship on these issues. In short, the most productive approach for philosophers 
hoping to work with Foucault, beyond Foucault, lies in a methodological pluralism that 
draws on all available tools and modes of inquiry. 
CLOSE ENCOUNTERS: CONTEXTUALISM IN HUFFER’S MAD FOR FOUCAULT 
Recall that contextualists study historical material on its own terms to reconstruct the 
intentions of a philosopher or the meaning of a text by means of immersion in the ar-
chive, textual exegesis, and consideration of the relevant facts of a thinker’s personal, 
intellectual, political, or cultural milieu. Here I consider Lynne Huffer’s 2010 book Mad 
for Foucault as an exemplary work of contextualist Foucault scholarship that deploys its 
characteristic methods to offer a novel interpretation of Foucault’s understudied and ill-
understood History of Madness.45 In contrast to readings of History of Madness that either 
praise or lambast its historical account of madness,46 claim it as a foundational text of the 
anti-psychiatry movement,47 take issue with its interpretation of Descartes,48 or fore-
ground its historicization of the modern notion of history,49 Huffer seeks to reclaim the 
book as “one of the great unread texts of queer theory.”50 
For Huffer, History of Madness offers an experiential account of sexuality that is thick-
er than Foucault’s discussion of sexuality in the first volume of The History of Sexuality, 
La Volonté de Savoir (The Will to Know), to which queer theory owes much of its theoreti-
cal grounding. Her work thus also challenges queer theory’s narrow focus on The Will to 
Know, which is further distorted by a misinterpretation of Foucault’s work through the 
lens of a specifically American understanding of sexual identity. 
Just as Foucault’s History of Madness examines the moment of division between reason 
and its other, Huffer situates her project at a dividing event, namely, the emergence of 
queer theory through a split from feminist analyses of oppression framed in terms of the 
sex/gender system. Against the feminist emphasis on gender oppression, queer theorists 
mobilized Foucault to affirm sexuality, rather than gender, as the primary vector of sub-
jectivation. As Huffer points out, queer theorists accomplished this by reading a specifi-
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cally American understanding of sexual identity into Foucault’s work and attributing to 
him a distinction between gender, sex, and sexuality that, as she demonstrates, is not 
warranted by the French terminology. The French term Foucault uses, le sexe, denotes all 
those elements that are captured by the English terms sex and gender. Thus, when Fou-
cault says that le sexe is an “imaginary point fixed by the dispositif of sexuality,”51 he 
decidedly does not argue that either sex (understood as biological difference) or sexuali-
ty (understood as sexual identity) are prior to or the cause of gender. Rather, sexuality is 
a specifically biopolitical dispositif. That is, it is an ensemble of discourses and practices 
that responds to the need to make life knowable and manageable by naturalizing le sexe 
as a “causal principle” when in fact it is a “fictitious unity” of “anatomical elements, bio-
logical functions, conducts, sensations, pleasures.”52 For Huffer, then, sex, gender, and 
sexuality are inextricably tied both to each other and to disciplinary and regulatory forms 
of biopower that deal in the administration of life and death – a link that is largely 
unacknowledged by feminist and queer theorists. 
I will return to this erasure of Foucault’s genealogy of biopower in his account of sex-
uality in subsequent sections. Here I want to focus on Huffer’s central claim that Fou-
cault’s early work on madness is also an analysis of sexuality.53 This claim finds prima 
facie evidential support in Foucault’s 1961 preface to History of Madness, where he situ-
ates madness among a series of “limit-experiences” that define Western culture. Fou-
cault describes the book as a story about how the exclusion of madness allowed for 
Western reason to be defined in distinction from its expelled other. On his view, mad-
ness is, therefore, one example of a more general structure of exclusion that facilitates 
the constitution of Western culture by distinguishing itself from and excluding what it is 
not. In addition to madness, Foucault cites “the Orient,” dreams, and sexual prohibitions 
as such limit-experiences. He adds that as “a limit of our Occidental world and the 
origin of its morality,” sexual prohibitions, in particular, reveal “the tragic division of 
the happy world of desire.”54 
One way of reading Huffer’s project is as a careful explication of Foucault’s brief re-
mark about the constitution of sexuality and sexual prohibitions as a limit-experience 
whose expulsion grounds Western morality. This is not to deny the novelty and im-
portance of other aspects of her work, such as her attention to spatial figures and hetero-
topias in Foucault’s account, her treatment of the methodological challenge of studying 
experiences in history, her reflections on the importance of literary style as a vector of 
meaning in Foucault, or her elaboration of archival work as an erotic, as it were, prac-
tice. Here I propose to read Huffer as expounding on Foucault’s prefatory comment in 
order to foreground what I take to be her key contribution to contextualist Foucault 
scholarship, namely, her account of sexuality’s constitutive role for Western morality in 
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its function of excluding erotic desire from the realm of reason. Against the thin notion 
of sexuality which queer theory adopted via its narrow and Americanized reception of 
The Will to Know, Huffer argues that History of Madness yields a thick, experiential ac-
count of sexuality that can serve as the basis of a queer feminist ethics of erotic experi-
ence. Restoring to History of Madness its sexual dimension, Huffer shows that sexual de-
viance here emerges as a mode of subjectivity that is created by the very rationalist 
forms of moral exclusion that also produce madness. As the effect, rather than the cause 
of this exclusion, the “libertines, debauchers, prostitutes, sodomites, nymphomaniacs, 
and homosexuals” that populate the pages of Foucault’s book are, therefore, subjects 
whose sexual deviance positions them outside the realm of reason and thereby estab-
lishes them as mad. In other words, it is through a “specifically sexual logic” that mod-
ern rationalism ties erotic love to unreason and relegates sexual deviance to the sphere 
of madness.55 
Huffer shows that it is only against the background of this account of sexuality in His-
tory of Madness that we can fully appreciate Foucault’s analysis in The Will to Know. For 
the transformation of a pre-modern erotic experience “within which the juridical subject 
was the ‘author’ of his acts”56 into an object of modern scientific reason recounted in the 
early book is the basis for Foucault’s later inquiry into how “the homosexual of the 19th 
century has become a character (un personnage).”57 That is, in contrast to common read-
ings of The Will to Know as identifying a decisive break between sexual acts and sexual 
identity in the second half of the 19th century, Foucault here actually adds to his account 
of the interrupted descent of modern sexuality whose continued emergence has its con-
ditions of possibility in the formation of 17th-century rationalist philosophy, 18th and 
19th-century psychiatry, and 20th-century psychoanalysis. On this view, Foucault’s en-
tire work comes into view as a genealogy aimed at the problematization of modern sex-
uality: that is, showing that and how modern sexuality has contingently congealed into 
its current form as an object of a positivist science intended to know, administer, and 
regulate life.  
Huffer’s analysis suggests that by taking up the very concept of sexuality Foucault’s 
genealogical critique seeks to problematize, queer theorists perpetuate the rationalist 
exclusion of desire, the subjectivation of the individual through scientific objectification, 
and disciplinary as well as biopolitical normalization of sexual experience emptied of all 
erotic life. They thereby foreclose an ethics of experience that enhances possibilities for 
free action by rescuing erotic love from its confinement to madness and unreason. A 
queer feminist ethics of eros thus requires the rehabilitation of a more expansive concept 
of sexuality Huffer excavates from History of Madness. 
Even though this rather brief discussion certainly does not do justice to Huffer’s rich 
analysis, it draws attention to those aspects of Mad for Foucault that allow for its interpre-
tation as an exemplary case of contextualist Foucault scholarship. From this perspective, 
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Huffer’s primary aim is to offer a careful reconstruction of Foucault’s experiential ac-
count of sexuality in History of Madness that provides a more complete picture of the phi-
losopher’s thought than a narrow focus on The Will to Know. The method she uses to ac-
complish this is a particular kind of reading practice she describes as a “close encoun-
ter.” By this Huffer means a way of engaging with Foucault’s text and context that 
“takes seriously the historical, conceptual, institutional and rhetorical dimensions of 
Foucault’s writing.”58 Consider, for instance, her painstaking attention to the subtleties 
of the original French text, which is not a result of her desire to “be pedantic by indulg-
ing in obscure etymologies or hairsplitting differences of definition” but of the “consid-
erable importance of the passage in question for an entire generation of thinking about 
sexuality.”59 Or take the importance of Foucault’s marginal notes on unpublished manu-
scripts and the cadence of his “ghost voice,” preserved on tape in the Normandy ar-
chive, which add layers of meaning to the written words of his corpus.60 Similarly, 
Huffer emphasizes the “guilty pleasure” of reading Foucault’s not publicly available 
letters to his lover, Jean Barraqué, which were not written for her and yet “are part of the 
fabric that forms History of Madness and part of the story of my own … mad plunge into 
Foucault.”61 
It is precisely this immersion in the archive and her attention to text and context that 
allow Huffer to offer a novel and insightful interpretation of Foucault’s early work 
which brings into view one of its previously overlooked aspects. As she puts it, 
Reencountering Foucault, in Sexuality One, through the lens of a Madness that most of 
his queer readers have missed altogether allows me to resituate his thinking about 
sexuality as a consistent engagement, from start to finish, with ethics. The concepts 
and frames for thinking about sex that emerge out of that process of reengagement 
and revision challenge some of the most dogmatically reiterated idées reçues about sex-
uality in Foucault.62 
Even though it might be tempting to interpret Huffer’s deployment of a fuller Foucauld-
ian account of sexuality for a queer feminist ethics of eros as an appropriationist project, 
I believe her work can plausibly be understood as a corrective to the “nonreading”63 of 
Foucault that gave rise to the queer-feminist split in the first place. On this view, Mad for 
Foucault is a great work of contextualist Foucault scholarship whose strength lies in its 
restoration of a notion of sexuality that extricates gender and sexuality from discourses 
of acts and identity and reveals them as effects of moral exclusion produced by reason. 
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SUSPENDED RESERVES:  
APPROPRIATIONISM IN DEUTSCHER’S FOUCAULT’S FUTURES 
I now turn my attention to Penelope Deutscher’s recent book, Foucault’s Futures: A Cri-
tique of Reproductive Reason, to contrast Huffer’s contextualist work with an appropria-
tionist approach. Like Huffer, Deutscher observes “a strong separation between the 
fields engaging [Foucault’s] work on sex (for example within sexuality studies and 
queer theory) and his work on biopolitics (for example, within post-Foucauldian Italian 
philosophy).”64 Instead of bridging this gap through a faithful reconstruction of Fou-
cault’s genealogy of the emergence of sexuality as a biopolitical dispositif, however, 
Deutscher focuses on reproduction, a peripheral topic in his work, to bring the litera-
tures on sex and biopolitics into conversation. 
Deutscher’s central claim concerns biopolitical and thanatopolitical varieties of re-
production that allow for the stimulation, fostering, and optimization of some reproduc-
tive conducts and the management and prevention of others through a complex layering 
of sovereign, disciplinary, and biopolitical powers of life and death. To develop this 
claim, she builds on Foucault’s insight that in modern societies sovereign, disciplinary, 
and regulatory powers operate in conjunction. As Foucault repeatedly insists, the tradi-
tional sovereign right to kill does not disappear under conditions of bio-power but is 
deployed for new aims and justified by different rationalities.65 Killing is no longer an 
act of war in defense of the sovereign but a biopolitical strategy intended to maximize 
the life of a population by eliminating internal and external threats to its health.  
Following Foucault, Deutscher argues that this polyvalence of power provides an in-
structive matrix for illuminating the complex interplay of various political rationalities 
and techniques of power that underpin discourses and practices of reproduction. In bio-
political societies, reproductive subjects can variously be figures of life and individual 
and collective futurity, on the one hand, and a principle of death whose reproductive 
decisions threaten those futures, on the other. Under conditions of biopolitics, reproduc-
tion constitutes an “interchange” (échangeur), to use Foucault’s emblematic term,66 that 
facilitates the simultaneous circulation of sovereign powers of death, biopolitical powers 
of life, and biopolitical powers of death. Reproductive subjects are, thus, pseudo-
sovereign67 reproductive decision-makers at the same time as they are a biopolitical 
source of life and a threat to individual and collective futures. 
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To illustrate this claim, Deutscher gives the example of “the aborting woman,” who 
exercises a sovereign power of death that endangers the future of the population, and 
contrasts her with “welfare” or “illegal immigrant” mothers, whose reproduction, rather 
than the termination of this reproduction, is said to threaten collective life.68 She also 
highlights the coincidence of various forms of power in the peculiar legal status of abor-
tion, which she describes as “inverted states of exception” in which the state negotiates 
its biopolitical interest in some but not other individual and collective lives by allowing 
certain abortions as sovereign exceptions from a general law that makes abortion as such 
illegal.69 
These examples demonstrate that discourses about reproduction, such as debates 
about reproductive rights, refract a plurality of powers as well as a plurality of lives and 
deaths that are at stake in reproduction and cannot be disaggregated. Moreover, 
Deutscher’s analysis reveals that insofar as reproduction constitutes a biopolitical tech-
nology that seeks to optimize the life and health of individuals and collectives, it cannot 
but also be a thanatopolitical technology of death that prevents and manages those 
forms of life that are cast as less valuable and as impediments to life. 
A crucial ethical implication of the complex interplay of powers, lives, and deaths in 
the context of reproduction is, as Deutscher succinctly puts it, that “there is no ‘ethics’ 
proper…: there are contingent ethics in relation to concurrently coalescing objects for 
concurrently forming agents or microagencies or collective agents.”70 Such contingent 
ethics demand that we grapple with what Deutscher calls “ontological tact,” that is, in-
compatible yet overlapping “medical and social protocols and conduct” through which 
lives are given or denied significance.71 Consider, for instance, a “fetus’s ambiguous sta-
tus as ‘more’ or ‘less’ human, as grievable, disposable, waste, anticipated or desired,” 
depending on the concrete circumstances of a given pregnancy. A “tactful protocol” will 
allow for this ambiguity and enable a consensual making of fetal life between parents, 
families, and medical practitioners.72 In certain reproductive contexts, however, such 
tactful protocols will only be possible by unequal access to ontological tact in the making 
and unmaking of fetal life. Consider, for example, surrogacy, where the reproductive 
freedom of some is secured through a curtailment of the reproductive freedom of others 
– namely that of the surrogate – by excluding the latter from decisions about the fetus’s 
life, value, and significance. For Deutscher, ethical considerations of reproduction and 
reproductive lives, rights, and choices cannot simply engage in utilitarian calculation 
that weighs the surrogate’s costs against parents’ gain but require genealogical attention 
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to the concrete conditions under which certain reproductive conducts become possible 
and calculable in the first place.  
As a critique of reproductive reason, Foucault’s Futures leverages Foucault’s concep-
tual framework to inquire into the conditions and limits of thinking about reproduction 
in biopolitical societies. To be sure, Foucault’s Futures charts the contours of a genealogy 
of reproductive biopolitics and biopolitical reproduction – for instance in its discussion 
of the legal status of abortion in the United States, analysis of abortion in Romania under 
Ceausescu, or examination of the transactions of international surrogacy. But at the cen-
ter of Deutscher’s work lies a methodological strategy that creatively appropriates Fou-
cault’s work for contemporary analysis by bringing into conversation the omissions, 
reserves, and suspensions in the work of Foucault and a range of other thinkers. She 
explicitly mobilizes Foucault’s gaps and silences – what she calls “suspended reserves”73 
– to interrogate how “absent concepts and problems can be given a shape in potentially 
transformative ways within philosophical frameworks which have omitted them.”74 This 
focus on “what does not lie front and center…, what lies held in reserve”75 is a deliberate 
effort to open up conceptual possibilities that are no less productive for being “jarring 
with the context in which [they emerge].” Instead of criticizing Foucault for what he did 
not do or defensively showing how his work can, after all, accommodate what others 
find missing, she foregrounds “the capacity of the negative contours corresponding to 
an absent problem to emerge within the work in question.”76 Her aim is to show that 
and how “concepts can emerge through a process of mutual confrontation not just be-
tween texts, arguments, theorists, and philosophers but also, and more particularly, 
through the relationship between their capacities and incapacities.”77 Omissions, in other 
words, are not failures but occasions for transformation that, in classic Foucauldian fash-
ion, expand our freedom to think and act. 
Crucially, this mode of engaging Foucault’s work shows that an ostensibly absent 
phenomenon in his work is, in fact, at the heart of his genealogy of biopolitics. Through 
careful reconsideration of his analyses of both biopolitics and sex, Deutscher shows that 
his lack of explicit attention to reproduction actually obscures its central role in biopolit-
ical societies as the link that ties biopower to sex. As becomes clear through her careful 
reconsideration of work on biopolitics and sex, Foucault’s genealogy of biopolitics is 
simultaneously a genealogy of white supremacy that deploys eugenic practices which 
regulate sexuality to incite reproductive conducts that are deemed desirable and stymie 
those cast as threatening the race.78 Thus Deutscher’s extension of the Foucauldian con-
ceptual framework of biopower to questions of reproduction is by no means accidental. 
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Rather, it is the result of and made possible by her nuanced contextualist knowledge of 
Foucault’s work. 
The more general lesson to be drawn from this discussion is that the perceived di-
lemma between contextualism and appropriationism rests on a misconception of their 
relationship. While we saw in the previous section that it is possible to engage in contex-
tualist Foucault scholarship without also appropriating his concepts, Deutscher’s work 
makes clear that the reverse is not true. Appropriationist uses of Foucault must engage 
in contextualist examination of the conceptual material that is appropriated. Without a 
minimum of contextualist understanding of the concepts to be taken up, it may be more 
accurate to speak of inspiration and innovation rather than appropriation. Contextual-
ism should thus be understood as an enabling condition of appropriationist scholarship. 
In the next section, I examine how methodologism fits into this picture. 
GENEALOGY: METHODOLOGISM IN REPO’S THE BIOPOLITICS OF GENDER 
In the preceding sections, I examined contextualist and appropriationist attempts to ad-
dress a rather widespread failure to recognize the cohesiveness of Foucault’s accounts of 
biopower and sexuality. Where Huffer’s contextualist project seeks to correct this failure 
by extracting a more comprehensive account of sexuality from Foucault’s own work, 
Deutscher uses it as an occasion for a consideration of reproduction. In this section, I 
examine Jemima Repo’s book The Biopolitics of Gender as a methodologist example of 
bringing into conversation Foucault’s work on sexuality and biopower.79  Repo’s work is 
particularly instructive for my purposes because she develops her biopolitical genealogy 
of gender as an explicit response to the missed connection between biopower and sexu-
ality in Foucault’s work that also motivates Huffer’s and Deutscher’s inquiries. 
Repo notes that even though gender has become ubiquitous in feminist theory as an 
analytic tool, it has not itself been subject to feminist analysis. Against the “foundational 
assumption about the ontological status of gender as the construction of sexual differ-
ence,” Repo proposes to make it the object of analysis in order to reveal the forms of 
knowledge, relations of power, and political rationalities that make gender discourse 
possible in the first place.80 This methodological approach clearly distinguishes Repo’s 
work from contextualism and appropriationism. Instead of extracting a genealogy of 
gender from Foucault’s own work or extending his conceptual apparatus to accommo-
date gender, she adopts his methods to trace a genealogy of gender from American 
sexological research in the 1950s to contemporary gender mainstreaming policies in Eu-
rope. 
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Repo’s genealogy aims to problematize the presumably obvious idea that gender is 
the cultural expression of biological sex. She follows Foucault’s methodological injunc-
tion to analyze ostensibly universal phenomena as practices, that is, as a “’way of doing 
things’ directed towards objectives and regulating itself by continuous reflection.”81 Ac-
cordingly, Repo proposes that we do not take gender as a universal category but as a 
practice whose formation we can empirically describe. Her methodological premise, to 
use Foucault’s words, is to suppose that gender does not exist and to ask, “what can his-
tory make of these different events and practices which are apparently organized 
around something that is supposed to be [gender]?”82 Drawing on archival material con-
sisting of sexological research, early feminist gender theory, demographic analyses, and 
gender mainstreaming policies, Repo shows that gender is a historically specific con-
struct, or dispositif, whose emergence was made possible by certain forms of power and 
knowledge from which gender cannot easily be extricated. Specifically, it is an appa-
ratus of biopower deployed by post-war liberal forms of government in order to manage 
life by disciplining and regulating the bodies of individuals and collectives in accord-
ance with particular white, middle-class values of (re)productivity. 
Repo shows, for example, that gender was first articulated in the mid-1950s by John 
Money as part of a critique of traditional biological views of sex. While a person’s sex 
had conventionally been regarded as determined by biological variables such as gonads, 
chromosomes, genitals, hormones, or reproductive structures, Money’s research on in-
tersex children led him to posit a notion of psychological sex, or gender, that was dis-
tinct from biology. Repo demonstrates that this new notion of gender made possible 
new protocols for the medical, surgical, and psychological treatment of intersex chil-
dren. Moreover, under the influence of new functionalist theories that regarded behav-
ior as the outcome of social control, Money’s work facilitated the extension of medical 
and social authority into the family, which took on a crucial role in the socialization of 
children into a socially accepted gender. The “biomedical invention of gender” thus gal-
vanized new means of population control intended to prop up a post-war social order 
based on nuclear families of different-sex desiring, reproductive adults.83 
Repo further demonstrates that gender’s function as a mechanism of social control 
was solidified and extended in the 1960s, when Robert Stoller transformed Money’s no-
tion of gender as a psychological dimension of sex into a separate, cultural category al-
together unmoored from biology. Informed by psychoanalysis and cultural anthropolo-
gy, Stoller aligned sex with nature and gender with culture and sought to determine the 
precise relation between the two. His test case, quite literally, was “the male transsexual 
subject,” whose “deviant gender identity” Stoller attributed to disturbances in psycho-
sexual development caused by neurotic mothers.84 Consequently, he argued that the 
prevention of social disorder and the creation of happy individuals required either that 
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normal psychosexual development was ensured by way of a policing of families, espe-
cially mothers, or that adult transsexuals be given access to surgical intervention to 
achieve individual liberation and self-improvement. Couched in a liberal discourse of 
happiness, Repo notes,  
the gender apparatus … not only enabled the production of an etiology of gender 
identity deviation rooted in the emotional economy of the family but also was party to 
the production of diagnostic requirements and categories that aimed to transform and 
liberate the transsexual into a happy, rational, self-examining, and socially productive 
subject.85 
Repo’s close examination of early feminist gender theory, demographic research, and 
European Union policies reveals the profound implications of gender’s birth as a biopo-
litical apparatus of liberal social engineering. Challenging the common view that gender 
is a feminist invention, she shows that feminist gender theory was able to contest scien-
tific theories about sexual difference by taking up the very terms of those theories. In-
deed, Repo argues that by explicitly drawing on Money and Stoller, feminist gender 
theorists inherited the  
same sexological, sociological, and psychological theories that produced the split be-
tween sex and gender through which the technologies of power to govern sex, sexual 
behavior, and sexual subjectivities were consolidated precisely by undermining bio-
logical categories of sex in favor of gender through the production of sex/gender ab-
normality.86 
The emancipatory potential of feminist gender theory in its second-wave Anglo-
American incarnation thus came at the price of dealing in the very forms of power it 
sought to oppose and reproducing the race and class biases that permitted and required 
the formation of gender to begin with.  
Similarly, Repo shows that ostensibly progressive policies that claim to advance the 
liberal agenda by securing gender equality and women’s rights are, in fact, forms of 
population control that facilitate the regulation of reproduction, sexual behavior, and 
life. For instance, she suggests that the expansion of recognition of diverse family forms 
is primarily driven by the threat of families whose institutional invisibility makes them 
ungovernable. Thus “the creation and inclusion of new subcategories in the definition of 
‘family nucleus’ … are part of the reterritorializing response to a perceived escape of 
intimate social life from the grips of normalization.”87 In the same vein, the reproductive 
labor of racialized populations whose reproduction is deemed undesirable is redirected 
towards care work, which allows for the application of gender equality policies to re-
productively desirable populations.88 In classical (neo)liberal fashion, gender has thus 
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become an “invisible hand” that directs individuals’ behavior by modulating their envi-
ronment so as to incite or discourage certain conducts.89 
Repo’s genealogical critique of gender as an apparatus of biopower that has its condi-
tions of possibility in a particular 20th-century liberal and neoliberal problematization of 
life and reproduction raises the difficult challenge of wrestling with the undeniable pro-
gressive potential of gender which comes at the cost of perpetuating some of gender’s 
oppressive dimensions. Instead of assessing her reflections on the possibility of a femi-
nism without gender, however, I want to draw attention to the role of contextualism and 
appropriationism in Repo’s genealogy.  
First, note that both a key premise of Repo’s work – namely that biopower is crucial 
for understanding Foucault’s genealogy of sexuality – and her understanding of geneal-
ogy as a method rely on contextualist engagement with Foucault. It is, thus, not surpris-
ing that the theoretically most ambitious parts of her book engage in careful contextual-
ist Foucault scholarship to articulate his notion of genealogy and challenge what Repo 
sees as a misguided naturalization and universalization of gender indexed not to histor-
ically specific relations of biopower but to a “de-historicized realm of language.”90 
Second, we saw in section 2 that even though philosophical inquiry aims to generate 
concepts, any inquiry requires categories that “structure from the outset the conceptual 
range of the inquiry to be conducted.”91 Repo’s challenge is that her suspension of gen-
der as an explanatory or analytic category creates a categorial void that must be filled for 
her analysis to have any structure at all. She resolves this difficulty by way of an appro-
priationist categorization of Foucault’s concept of biopower, which appears to open her 
up to Koopman’s objection against Agamben, namely, that of transcendentalization and 
equivocation. There is, however, a crucial difference between Agamben’s positing of 
biopower as a transcendental idea for speculative philosophical inquiry and Repo’s stra-
tegic deployment of biopower as a contextually limited category to illuminate the histor-
ically specific relations of power underpinning contemporary formations of gender. In-
sofar as Repo’s aim is to narrate the history of gender in our own biopolitical present, 
her categorization of biopower is not only permissible but crucial for critique. For as 
Foucault argued, the task of critique is to offer a “historical investigation into the events 
that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what 
we are doing, thinking, saying.” 
In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a 
metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method. 
Archaeological – and not transcendental – in the sense that it will not seek to identify 
the universal structures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek 
to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so 
many historical events. And this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will 
not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to 
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know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the 
possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.92 
In contrast to Agamben’s stipulation of biopower as the universal structure of the politi-
cal, Repo’s genealogy offers a philosophical critique of a specifically Anglo-American 
idea of gender as it functions in Western biopolitical (neo)liberal societies. This analysis 
not only sharpens Huffer’s criticism of an unreflective extension of American notions of 
gender and sexual identity to other contexts, but also brings into relief the neoliberal 
rationality that underpins biopolitical and thanatopolitical varieties of reproduction ex-
amined by Deutscher. Moreover, Repo’s methodologist use of Foucault highlights the 
complex relationship between contextualism, appropriationism, and methodologism 
insofar as her particular genealogy depends on both a contextualist account of sex and 
biopolitics and an appropriationist use of Foucault’s concept of biopower. 
To be sure, Repo’s particular genealogy is made possible by both contextualist and 
appropriationist work. Yet, while all methodologists must engage in contextualist schol-
arship to determine what the method is, it is not necessary that they also deploy Fou-
cault’s specific concepts. Depending on the particular site of inquiry, however, they 
might require contextualist knowledge of concepts to determine when a concept does 
work, when it must be modified, or when it should be abandoned in favor of a different 
or new concept. Thus, there is methodologist Foucault scholarship that (1) also deploys 
his concepts;93 (2) supplements his concepts where archaeological or genealogical in-
quiry makes modified or new concepts necessary;94 or (3) uses his methods without tak-
ing up his concepts.95 What unites them is their use of empirical historical methods with 
the aim of providing a philosophical critique of present problematizations whose speci-
ficity determines the extent to which Foucault’s concepts can also be utilized.  
CONCLUSION 
I have examined three philosophical engagements with Foucault’s work on sex and bi-
opower in order to distinguish three main ways of doing philosophy following Fou-
cault. Each of these approaches pursues specific aims, uses distinct methods, and gener-
ates different kinds of philosophical inquiry. Huffer’s contextualist project uses methods 
of archival research, textual exegesis, and attention to context in order to develop Fou-
cault’s account of sexuality on his own terms. Deutscher’s appropriationist work, by 
contrast, brings to bear Foucault’s analyses of sex and biopolitics to illuminate the dif-
ferent techniques of power as well as the multiple valences of life and death that coin-
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cide in reproduction. Finally, Repo’s methodologist use of Foucault adopts his methods 
to challenge the ostensibly self-evident idea that gender is a feminist invention intended 
to contest power, showing instead that it was forged by sexological research as a mech-
anism of biopolitical population control. 
This survey occasions reflection on some tensions in queer and feminist reception of 
Foucault’s work on power, sex, gender, and sexuality. Despite Foucault’s influential ac-
count of sexuality as well as his analytics of power, feminists remain critical of Foucault, 
some excellent interventions notwithstanding,96 for his lack of attention to feminist con-
cerns, his failure to consider women’s oppression, and the inadequacy of his analytic 
framework for emancipatory politics. The three philosophers examined here offer differ-
ent diagnoses of these tensions. For Huffer, feminist criticism is largely based on a mis-
reading and mistranslation of Foucault, while Deutscher attributes it to a common atti-
tude of “wanting what can’t be supplied from a theory understood as having failed to 
provide it.”97 For Repo, it stems from a lack of distinction between gender as a historical 
formation, on the one hand, and an analytic category, on the other. 
These different descriptions of the problem also give rise to distinct ways of address-
ing it, which might roughly be described in terms of resolution, transformation, and 
problematization. We saw that Huffer argues that queer theory’s contestation of the 
feminist prioritization of gender over sexuality relied heavily on a distinction between 
sexual acts and sexual identities that was derived from Foucault’s work. Huffer’s aim is 
to show that both these distinctions, i.e. between gender and sexuality and between acts 
and identities, result from a narrow focus on The Will to Know, on the one hand, and, on 
the other, a misreading of Foucault through the lens of a specifically American notion of 
identity that is absent from the French text and context – a claim that is also supported 
by Repo’s work, which shows that a notion of gender identity only emerged in the 1960s 
in US sexology. Accordingly, Huffer’s goal is to establish what Foucault really said 
about sexuality. To this end, she subjects his early work on madness as well as a number 
of unpublished and marginal texts to textual exegesis and hermeneutical interpretation 
and supplements them with a consideration of his biographical and social context. The 
result is a more comprehensive and plausible account of Foucault’s concept of sexuality 
that resolves the tensions in queer and feminist Foucault reception by highlighting the 
emergence of sexuality in the context of the ascendancy of Western rationalism that also 
gave rise to new forms of power and knowledge centered on the management and ad-
ministration of life. 
Like Huffer, Deutscher also notes the separation of Foucault’s work on sex and bi-
opower in contemporary queer and feminist scholarship and biopolitical theory. But 
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rather than showing that this separation is not actually present in Foucault’s own work, 
Deutscher reads his analysis of sex and sexuality in conjunction with his account of bio-
politics. Specifically, she thinks to its end Foucault’s undeveloped claim that when sex 
and biopolitics intersect both are reproductive, to lay bare the complex interplay of dif-
ferent technologies of power and political rationalities that coincide in reproduction and 
whose targeting of individuals and collectives is gendered, raced, and classed. 
Deutscher’s methodological strategy thus consists of exploiting the conceptual resources 
of Foucault’s work so as to interrogate what remains untheorized – not as failure but as 
a suspended reserve to be mobilized. The guiding question is not so much what Fou-
cault did say or might have said about reproduction but how we can creatively appro-
priate his work to develop accounts of reproductive agency that are useful for our own 
present. As Deutscher notes, however, any normative response to the differential target-
ing of reproductive agents depends on genealogical inquiry into the conditions that 
stimulate or occlude specific conducts depending on factors such as differences of gen-
der, race, or class. 
It is in Repo’s work that we find such a genealogy of gender as a distinct third way of 
interrogating the relationship between sex, gender, and biopower. In contrast to recon-
structing Foucault’s actual account of sexuality or extending his conceptual framework 
to questions of reproduction, Repo asks what we can say about gender – a concept that 
is absent from Foucault’s work, as we saw – if we conduct empirical inquiry into the 
conditions that made its formation possible. Her answer is that gender was invented by 
American sexologists in the 1950s and deployed as a mechanism of biopolitical control 
intended to create happy, reproductive individuals in accordance with post-war liberal 
ideology. Adding to Deutscher’s analysis of reproduction, Repo’s genealogy shows that 
gender functions as a biopolitical apparatus of social control through which reproduc-
tive behavior can be regulated – that is, stimulated or restrained – in accordance with 
racialized and class-based biases about what forms of reproduction are beneficial for the 
life of the population. 
In conclusion, my aim was to draw on existing debates about the relationship be-
tween philosophy and its past in order to outline three strands of Foucault scholarship 
and explicate their respective strengths. It has not been my intention to provide criteria 
for discriminating between good and bad versions of each strand; provide a technique of 
purification that allows us to sort existing scholarship into neatly contained classifica-
tions; or endorse any one approach as the best or “most Foucauldian.” Instead I sought 
to affirm the valuable contributions each mode has to offer to Foucault scholarship and 
supply heuristic tools that aid self-reflection about various aims for which we might take 
up Foucault and how we can best pursue them. As I hope to have shown, different ques-
tions not only require different methods that generate different answers and solutions; 
the strands of Foucault scholarship outlined here also intersect with and enrich one an-
other in ways that reveal the strategic importance of their joint deployment. The three 
uses of Foucault examined in this paper show that and how his work can be mobilized 
for philosophical investigation even when the issues under consideration appear to be 
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un- or undertheorized in his work. Instead of criticizing him for what he failed to con-
sider, we should pause to reflect on our own aims for philosophical inquiry and adjust 
accordingly our mode of doing philosophy following Foucault. 
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